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REPRESENTATION IN NET WORTH
CASES
PAUL P. LIPTON* AND RICHARD A. PETRIE**
Much has been said and written about the substantive law appli-
cable to the net worth method," but there has been relatively little
comment about such practical aspects as the advisability of furnishing
net worth statements, the consequences of refusing to furnish net
worth data, and the methods of challenging a net worth determination.
It is the purpose of this article to consider very briefly some of these
problems which arise during representation in net worth cases.
THE NET WORTH METIHOD--IN GENERAL
Ordinarily, deficiencies are determined by adjusting items of re-
ported gross income or by disallowing deductions claimed by the
taxpayer. The net worth approach, on the other hand, is a method of
reconstructing income. It is premised on the accounting formula
that an increase in net worth plus nondeductible expenditures, minus
nontaxable receipts, equals taxable income. If the annual net worth
increases and nondeductible expenditures are not accounted for by
reported income and nontaxable receipts, the discrepancy is presumed
to be current unreported income, and deficiencies are determined
accordingly. 2
The net worth method accurately reconstructs net income provided
all pertinent facts are ascertainable and the net worth statements are
consistent with the method of accounting employed.3 The taxpayer
may have difficulty, however, in recalling or establishing ownership
of visible assets, such as real estate or securities, and it may be im-
possible for him to establish the amount of cash on hand. As a result,
assets omitted from opening net worth, which are converted into
other assets in later years, may be reflected as unexplained increases
in net worth. Even though the total discrepancy between net worth
increases and reported income does represent unreported taxable in-
*Attorney (Wisconsin, Massachusetts); Formerly Special Attorney and Tax
Court Trial Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service; Mem-
ber, Committee on Procedure in Fraud Cases, Section of Taxation, American
Bar Association; Member, American, Federal, and Wisconsin Bar Associations.
**Attorney (Wisconsin) ; Member, Wisconsin Bar Association; Associate, Paul
P. Lipton, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
I See e.g. Avakian, The Net Worth Method of Establishing Fraud, PROC. NYU
11TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 707 (1953); Burns and Rachlin, Trial by Net Worth,
33 TAXES 121 (1955) ; Lipton, Status of Net Worth Prosecutions, PROC. MARQ.
5TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 224 (1956); Mills, The Net Worth Approach in De-
termining Income, 41 VA. L. REv. 927 (1955).
2 BALTER, FRAUD UNmER FEDERAL TAX LAW 226 (2d ed. 1953).
- For example, if the cash basis of accounting has been properly employed, the
net worth statement should not reflect business receivables or payables.
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come, it may not be possible to apportion the unreported income
accurately to the year or years in which it was in fact realized.
Notwithstanding the great danger of inaccuracies, the net worth
method has been employed extensively. It provides an effective
auditing technique, often disclosing unreported income which would
not be discovered through an audit of books and accounts. In a routine
examination 4 there is normally no occasion for the submission of net
worth data to the examining agent. Should the revenue agent request
net worth statements or pay undue attention to net worth items, fraud
is probably suspected, and it is, therefore, imperative that the taxpayer
obtain legal representation.-
LIMITATIONS ON INvEsTIGATIW AUTHOiRITY
The various limitations on investigative authority are generally
applicable in any tax case, but they may assume added significance
when the net worth technique is employed. Not infrequently, net
worth investigations cover a lengthy period. The difficulty of refuting
the compilations, particularly for the early years, is often serious.
Records may have been lost or innocently destroyed, and essential
information may have been forgotten. As a result, efforts to show
errors in the net worth statements, or to explain the understatements,
may be fruitless, and the financial consequences to the taxpayer may
be disastrous.
Although Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a
broad power to compel production of records and the appearance of
witnesses,6 the statute obviously refers to the production of records
in existence at the time of demand and not to net worth statements
which would have to be compiled by the taxpayer or his representa-
tives5' However, this does not preclude a revenue agent from making
an informal request for net worth statements. In the event that the
taxpayer refuses to submit such statements, the agent may issue a
4The statement in the text refers to audits by the Internal Revenue Service.
The Wisconsin Department of Taxation makes extensive use of the net worth
method, and a request for net worth statements is not necessarily an indica-
tion that wrongdoing is definitely suspected.
5A well-known ceritfied public accountant has said that "an accountant does
not serve his client if he does not insist on the need for legal counsel as soon
as the use of the net worth approach is indicated." Mills, supra note 1, at 957.
6 Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 empowers the Secretary
of the Treasury, or his delegate, to conduct examinations for the purpose of
ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has
been made, determining liability for tax, and collecting any such liability; and
authority is granted to examine any books, papers, records or other data
which may be relevant or material to the inquiry, to summon the taxpayer
and other persons to produce books and records, and to take testimony under
oath.
7 See, however, Brody v. United States, 243 F. 2d 378 (1st Cir. 1957), wherein
the Court of Appeals affirmed an order directing the taxpayer to submit
weekly sworn statements of his expenditures. The Court probably was in-
fluenced by the fact that the taxpayer's counsel had conceded that this order,
though modifying the summons, was reasonable.
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summons calling for the production of all existing records bearing on
net worth, and he may summon the taxpayer to testify from memory
concerning these matters.
Whatever the investigative technique, the net worth examination
is subject to the statutory and constitutional limitations on investiga-
tive authority which apply in any tax inquiry. Since these limitations
have been the basis of extensive discussion in the past," further treat-
ment here would serve little purpose. Nevertheless, mention should
be made of one investigative restriction which may receive unusual
treatment in net worth cases. In general, years barred for assessment
by the statute of limitations are not subject to examination unless the
Commissioner can establish a reasonable basis for suspicion of fraud.,
In net worth investigations, it has been suggested that normally barred
years may be examined for the purpose of establishing a firm begin-
ning net worth,'0 but this conclusion is of doubtful validity.
As in all tax investigations, the limitations imposed by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution are particularly important. By in-
voking the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment, the individual taxpayer may decline to produce his records
or papers or to testify under oath. The sweeping protection of the
privilege in net worth investigations is well illustrated by the decision
in Vander v. United States," where the court upheld a taxpayer's
blanket refusal to answer questions concerning his assets on the
grounds that such answers might tend to incriminate him.
OBJECTIONS BY TiRD PARTIES
Net worth investigations frequently lead to records of various
third parties, such as banks, brokers, the taxpayer's employer, and
business associates. Such third parties may raise objections in their
own behalf,' 2 including the objection that the examination is barred
by the statute of limitations or "unnecessary" within the meaning of
the statute.' 3 The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreason-
able searches and seizures is the basis for most objections by third
s For a discussion of these limitations see, Lipton, Safeguarding Constitutional
Rights in Tax Fraud Investiqations, 32 TAXEs 263 (1954) ; Lipton, Privileged
Conntnunications, PRoc. N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 955 (1955); Lipton,
Record Keeping and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, PROC. N.Y.U.
14TH IN ST. ON FED. TAX. 1331 (1956) ; Redlich, Searches, Seizures, and Self-
Incrimination in Tax Cases, 10 TAX L. Rzv. 191 (1955).
O Baiter, supra note 1, at 157. For an excellent collection of cases and discus-
sion of the apparent conflict concerning the showing required to justify
examination of barred years, see In re Carroll, 246 F. 2d 762 (2d Cir 1957).
10 Falsone v. United States, 205 F. 2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 864 (1953).
".1119 F. Supp. 330 (E. D. Pa. 1954).
12 See Note, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Tax Investigations, 57 COLUm. L.
REv. 676 (1957) ; Note, The Inquisitorial Powers of the Federal Government
in Third Party Tax Investigations, 41 MINN. L. REv. 800 (1957).
'3 Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 123 F. 2d 791 (9th Cir. 1942). Section 7605
(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that no taxpayer shall
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parties.14 Recently, however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed two district courts decisions because the government
had not established that records summoned from third parties were
material or relevant to the inquiry.1 5
The benefits to the taxpayer may be substantial where legitimate
objections are timely raised. Unfortunately, however, most third
parties fail or refuse to urge possible objections. Of course, the tax-
payer may move to quash a summons directed to a third party, but
such attacks have been notably unsuccessful because of the extremely
limited grounds on which they may be made.16
COOPERATION vs. NoN-COOPERATION
IN NET WORTH INVESTIGATIONS
The considerations which determine the degree of cooperation to
be extended in a net worth investigation are similar in most respects
to those which apply to any tax investigation. Although extensive
treatment of this aspect would be desirable, this discussion will be
limited to a few general remarks and some specific comments on the
effect of cooperation in net worth cases.'7
It is still a widely accepted belief that the tax evader who coop-
erates, and is willing to pay what he owes, will not be prosecuted.
This false sense of assurance would soon disappear if it were com-
monly known that most tax prosecutions are based chiefly on evidence
voluntarily supplied by the taxpayer.' s Rather than serving to avoid
prosecution, cooperation has generally provided the government with
be subjected to unnecessary examinations or investigations and that only one
inspection shall be made of the taxpayer's books of account for each taxable
year. The cited case holds that the corresponding provision of the 1939 Code
(Section 3631) imposed a limitation on the government's power, and not
merely a personal objection available only to the taxpayer.
1' See, e.g., First National Bank of Mobile v. United States, 160 F. 2d 532 (5th
Cir. 1947).
'15 Local 174 v. United States, 240 F. 2d 387 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Hubner v. Tucker,
245 F. 2d 35 (9th Cir. 1957).26 Constitutional rights cannot be invoked by the taxpayer in behalf of a third
party. Zimmerman v. Wilson, 105 F. 2d 583 (3rd Cir. 1949). Nor can the
taxpayer, in such a proceeding, claim the benefit of the statute of limitations
or challenge the materiality of the inquiry. Schulman v. Dunlap, 105 F. Supp.
104 (S.D. N.Y. 1952); In re Upham, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. N.Y. 1937);
Cooley v. Bergin, 27 F. 2d 930 (D. Mass. 1928). It would seem however, that
a proceeding to quash would be appropriate to prevent violation of a privi-
leged relationship or to challenge an obvious abuse of process. Cf. Eckerling
v. Helvering, 41-1 USTC par. 9220 (N.D. Ill. 1941) (unsuccessful proceeding
to enjoin examination of a public accountant) ; United States v. Lipshitz, 148
F. Supp. 774 (E.D. N.Y. 1957) (court enjoined grand jury subpoenas in
action brought by the taxpayer).
17For a good discussion, see KOSTELANETZ AND BENDER, CRIMINAL AsPEcTs OF
TAX FRAUD CASES 57-61 (1957) ; Balter, Should Your Client 'Cooperate' When
Charged With Tax Fraud? 29 TAXES 290 (1951) ; Platt, Cooperation vs. Non-
Cooperation in Tax Fraud Cases, PRoc. OF N.Y.U. 10TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
1305 (1952).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Altruda, 224 F. 2d 935 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Lipton, The
Taxpayer's Rights: Investigation of Tax Fraud Cases, 42 A.B.A.J. 325(1956).
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the evidence necessary to indict and convict. On the other hand, a
policy of non-cooperation, wisely exercised, has saved many taxpayers
from prosecution.
In net worth fraud cases, particularly, cooperation is often inad-
visable. Accurate proof of the opening and closing net worth is crucial
in establishing unreported income. Without the taxpayer's coopera-
tion and admissions it is frequently difficult, if not impossible, for the
government to establish a solid opening net worth, especially the item
of "cash-on-hand". With respect to the closing net worth, coopera-
tion may involve such significant admissions as the non-existence of
liabilities or the taxpayer's ownership of assets held in the name of
another. Obviously, cooperation may disclose investments and ex-
penditures which could not otherwise be traced.
In most tax evasion cases based on the "net-worth method", the
evidence needed to justify the recommendation for prosecution was
supplied by cooperative taxpayers. 19 Such cooperation has also served
to supply the government with evidence needed to meet its burden
of proof with respect to the civil fraud penalty.
There may be important tactical advantages in avoiding the fool-
proof net worth determination which results from cooperation with
the investigators. Following a recommendation for prosecution, for
example, it may be possible to discredit the entire investigation by
pointing out important errors. Similar advantages may accrue in the
settlement of the civil aspects. The judicial reaction to this situation
is illustrated by the following comment in a recent Tax Court opinion :20
This is one of the most deplorable records from which we
have ever had to find facts or draw conclusions. The respondent's
net worth computation of petitioner's income was in a constant
state of flux from the time the revenue agent made his first
report until the reply brief was filed.
The Tax Court refused to uphold the fraud penalties, probably be-
cause it was not satisfied that the understatements had been clearly
proved by the government.
The advantages that flow from cooperation are confined primarily
to cases where the taxpayer's innocence can be demonstrated by com-
piling net worth statements which are consistent with reported income.
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO SUPPLY NET WORTH DATA
One of the obvious consequences of failure to cooperate will be
an attempt by the agents to obtain the necessary net worth data from
19 It has been aptly observed that "in practically every case in which a taxpayer
has been convicted, the opening net worth had been established through ad-
missions and actions of the taxpayer himself." Boughner, The Use of the
Net Worth Method as a Basis of Civil Liability, PROC. OF MARQ. 4TH INST.
ON FED. TAX. 16, 24 (1954).
20 William E. Josey, 15 T.C.M. 758, 760 (1956).
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other sources, such as banks, brokers, public records, etc. Usually,
however, it is very difficult for the agents to prepare accurate net
worth statements without the taxpayer's cooperation and access to
his books and records.
If the agent is unable to reconstruct the net worth from other
sources, he may issue a summons to the non-cooperative taxpayer to
produce the desired books and records and to testify concerning net
worth items. No summons will be issued, however, if criminal prose-
cution is contemplated. 21 In the event that a summons does issue,
the taxpayer may invoke any of the available statutory or constitu-
tional limitations on investigative authority as grounds for refusal
to comply. Refusal may result in the institution of a proceeding in
the district court to compel obedience, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 7604 of the 1954 Code.22 This procedure will not be employed
if the government concludes that the refusal was justied, or that the
requested information is not sufficiently important to warrant a court
proceeding.
As suggested above, a net worth determination made without the
taxpayer's cooperation is generally vulnerable to serious attack at the
appropriate time. Of course, lack of cooperation may force the in-
vestigating agents to abandon the net worth approach.
ATTACKING THE NET WORTH DETERMINATION
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Holland v. United
States,23 an important issue in most net worth cases was whether
resort to the method was justified when the taxpayer's books and
records were ostensibly accurate and complete. 24 Although this con-
tention may no longer be given any weight in criminal prosecutions,"
there is some indication that the issue warrants consideration in civil
cases.28 In any event, a showing that the taxpayer's books and records
are accurate and complete would tend to corroborate reported income
based on those records.
Generally speaking, it is important in a net worth case to make
every effort to minimize the apparent understatements of income,
and, wherever possible, to provide plausible explanations for known
21-.. . it is contained in a directive in the manual of the Intelligence Unit,
Internal Revenue Service, that you should never issue process to compel the
production of records . . . [if there is] the possibility of recommending crimi-
nal prosecution . . ." Testimony of a special agent; United States v. Beard,
(D. Md. 1954), Transcript, p. 681.
22 The procedure is discussed in Lipton, Procedural Aspects of the Subpoena
Power, PROc. N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1087 (1958).
23 348 US. 121 (1954).
24 Avakian, supra note 1, at 713.
25 Holland v. United States, supra note 23.
26 See David Courtney, 28 T.C. 58 (1957), where the Tax Court outlines the
showing required to establish that a net worth determination should be dis-
regarded.
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understatements in an effort to negative the inference of fraudulent
intent. In endeavoring to accomplish these objectives, however, tax-
payers' representatives frequently do their clients more harm than
good. As will be noted below, timing is exceedingly important.
MINIMIZING THE APPARENT UNDERSTATEMENTS
Unless it is reasonably certain that the apparent understatements
can be eliminated or reduced to amounts which are unsubstantial or
readily explainable, it is generally advisable that this showing be de-
ferred until the possibility of criminal prosecution has been eliminated.
Otherwise, the net result is that the taxpayer thereby furnishes the
government with clear-cut proof of understatements which could
not have been established without the admissions.
The task of attempting to minimize or eliminate the understate-
ments of income reflected by the government's net worth statements
involves a detailed investigation in which both the accountant and
lawyer should play a role. Usually, this aspect of representation in a
net worth case is regarded as an accounting matter. Although much
of the "digging" can best be done by an accountant, the task is basi-
cally a fact-finding job, not unlike that which is undertaken by lawyers
in many types of cases. A discussion of the techniques that may be
effectively employed, and the precise role that the accountant and
lawyer should undertake, is beyond the scope of this discussion. How-
ever, it is to be emphasized that the lawyer should actively direct the
investigation and that he should personally inspect all pertinent re-
cords. Moreover, the investigation should not be confined solely to
the determination of the correct net income, but should be utilized
to uncover every bit of evidence that has any bearing on the question
of intent. This makes it imperative that the lawyer participate very
closely.
Often, correction of errors in a net worth determination results
only in a shift of the understatement from year to year. rather than
in an overall decrease. The shifting of the understatement may be
helpful to the taxpayer in some cases, harmful in others. Great care
must be exercised in determining the appropriate time to disclose
information that may be harmful to the taxpayer.
ATTACKING THE FRAUD DETERMINATION
To sustain its burden of proving fraud, the government must
establish both an understatement of income and an intent to evade
tax.2 7 Obviously, the first step in attacking a fraud determination is
an attempt to eliminate the understatements or to reduce them to
amounts which are not substantial. This is not usually possible in
net worth cases; but it is frequently possible to successfully contend
27 Holland v. United States, supra note 25.
[Vol. 42
NET WORTH REPRESENTATION
that the government will not be able to carry its burden of proof on
the fraud issue.
In criminal cases, it has been readily apparent that the government
must prove that income was understated. There has been some confu-
sion in civil cases, however, which makes it desirable to review
briefly the principles governing burden of proof in civil fraud cases.
In proceedings before the Tax Court, the burden of proof with
respect to deficiencies rests upon the taxpayer, but the burden of prov-
ing fraud is placed upon the Commissioner by statute."- If assess-
ment is not barred by the statute of limitations, the deficiencies will
be upheld unless the taxpayer adduces proof sufficient to overcome
the presumption of correctness attaching to the Commissioner's deter-
mination. If the deficiencies are barred, the taxpayer has no burden
unless and until the Commissioner establishes fraud, in which case
he must meet his normal burden of proof.2 9
In order to prove an understatement of. income in a net worth
case, the government must establish opening net worth, including the
item of cash-on-hand, with reasonable certainty. The taxpayer's fail-
ure to disprove the government's opening net worth may require a
holding against him with respect to deficiencies not barred by the
statute of limitations, but should not be accepted as tantamount to
affirmative proof sufficient to carry the government's burden on the
fraud issue.
Relatively few decisions have clearly outlined and observed the
requirements of the burden of proof in civil fraud cases.30 Frequently,
the courts have assumed that an understatement of income had been
established where the record may have warranted only the conclusion
that the taxpayer had failed to carry his burden of proof as to the
deficiencies. 3 1  Occasionally, however, the correct result has been
reached on the ground that the Commissioner failed to prove "frau-
lent intent", though in reality an understatement of income had not
been established.
Although the need for the required proof has not been clearly
enunciated, there has been a definite trend recently in the appellate
courts to reject arbitrary determinations by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue with respect to opening cash-on-hand.32 These
decisions stress the necessity of an acurate determination by the
2 8 INT. REV. CoDE or 1954, §7454(a). The same rule prevails in the district courts,
though there is no specific statute applicable. Ohlinger v. United States, 219
F. 2d 310 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Hargis v. Godwin, 221 F. 2d 486 (8th Cir. 1955).
29See Lipton, Recent Civil Fraud Cases-Problems of Burden of Proof, 31
TAxEs 110 (1953), and Lipton, Trends in Tax Fraud Investigations and Liti-
gation, 34 TAXES 267, 275 (1956).
3oThe cases prior to 1956 are discussed in the articles cited in footnote 29. For
a recent, well-reasoned decision see Lureana, 31 T.C. No. 37 (1958).
31 See cases discussed in articles cited supra note 29.
82Thomas v. Commissioner, 223 F. 2d 83 (5th Cir. 1955); Rubino v. Commis-
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Commissioner and require that the record contain affirmative proof
establishing opening cash-on-hand.
CHALLENGING USE OF ESTIMATES
In attempting to prove an understatement of income on the net
worth basis, estimates and approximations cannot take the place of
proof in meeting the government's burden. This, in substance, is
why the item of cash-on-hand has caused the government considerable
difficulty. Frequently, other estimates and approximations are found
in a net worth determination, and the taxpayer's representative must
be alert to make effective use of any such weakness in the govern-
ment's case.
Items which are often estimated include living costs, inventories,
receivables, and payables. A recent Tax Court case serves as an apt
illustration of the difficulties which the government may encounter
in relying upon approximations in carrying its burden of proof. In
W. A. Shaw,33 the Commissioner had been able to substantiate inven-
tories and receivables at the opening and close of the net worth period,
but had no proof of the amounts of these items at the end of the
intervening years. With reference to this approach, the Tax Court
commented as follows :34
Obviously, this procedure results in estimates which are, at
best, crude approximations. If this case involved only deficien-
cies, and the burden of proof were entirely upon petitioner, we
would have to sustain such estimates, for petitioner has done noth-
ing to rebut them .... But the burden of proof rests upon re-
spondent in the instant case since the deficiencies for the years
1941 through 1946 are barred by the statute of limitations if
fraud is not proved for such years....
In support of its holding that the imposition of fraud penalties
could not be sustained, the Tax Court added :35
The basic fallacy in respondent's approach to the merchan-
dise inventories and accounts receivable is that there are no
grounds for assuming that they increased in the rigid, precise
fashion of an arithmetical progression. The increase in these
assets may have occurred entirely in one year and the fraud
might have been consummated solely in that year. In such a sit-
uation, there is no justification for spreading the deficiencies
and fraud penalties over a period of years. One of the funda-
mentals of our income tax system is the annual accounting con-
cept and, although the net worth method of determining an indi-
vidual's taxable income may result in some slight deviation from
this because of the approximations inherent in a net worth com-
putation, there is no authority in the Code for a complete disre-
sioner, 226 F. 2d 291 (6th Cir. 1955); Kashat v. Commissioner, 229 F. 2d 282
(6th Cir. 1956);Thomas v. Commissioner, 232 F. 2d 520 (1st Cir. 1956).
33 27 T.C. 561 (1956).
34Id. at 569.
35Id. at 570.
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gard of the principle that each year is a separate taxable unit.
Where the issue is fraud, we cannot assume that such fraud
occurred in each of the years in issue rather than solely in one.
DEMONSTRATING THAT UNDERSTATMENTS WERE NOT FRAuDULENT
Although the government has the burden of proving intent in a
fraud case, the Commissioner has rarely hesitated to impose fraud
penalties solely upon the basis of understatements of income. All too
frequently, the Commissioner's position has been approved by the
courts, even though there was no evidence of concealment or other
indicia of fraud.36 Therefore, with respect to understatements which
the Commissioner can establish by competent proof, every possible
effort should be made to provide explanations which negative the
inference of fraud. Explanations should not be attempted where the
government cannot clearly prove that income was understated. In his
haste to provide explanations, the taxpayer frequently makes admis-
sions which the government needs to carry its burden of proof. In
some cases, however, it is possible to provide "alternative" explana-
tions, without conceding that income was understated.
In fraud cases involving specific adjustments to income, the im-
portance of establishing explanations for the understatements has
always been apparent. In net worth cases, however, there has been a
tendency to concentrate on the net worth statements. Actually, since
the net worth method serves to conceal the cause of the understate-
ments, explanations may be of even greater importance than in a
specific adjustment case.3 7
Frequently it is possible to demonstrate that the understatements
are attributable, in whole or part, to technical adjustments, such as
the deduction of excessive depreciation or the improper deduction
of capital expenditures. Sometimes the understatements may be due
principally to a change in the accounting method. Thus, the inclusion
of business receivables in the net worth of a taxpayer who has errone-
ously employed the cash basis in reporting income will produce under-
statements of income. The explanation, however, should serve to
avoid the imposition of fraud penalties.
With respect to deficiencies which are due to technical adjustments,
it may be possible to successfully challenge a fraud charge by demon-
strating that the understatements resulted from mistakes, inadver-
tence, carelessness, poor record-keeping, or lack of adequate controls
in the bookkeeping system. This is by no means a comprehensive list,
but a full discussion of the many factors which are significant in
attacking the imposition of fraud penalties is beyond the scope of this
article.
36 See Lipton, supra note 29.
3,Avalian, Proper Handling of Potential Fraud Cases, PRoc. OF TE 7TH Tu-
LANE TAx INsT. 349, 369 (1958).
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